蔡 伟鑫 | Weixin Cai

摘要：Simpson’s paradox (SP) is a statistical phenomenon where the association between two variables reverses, disappears, or emerges, after conditioning on a third variable. It has been proposed (by, e.g., Judea Pearl) that SP should be analyzed using the framework of graphical causal models (i.e., causal DAGs) in which SP is diagnosed as a symptom of confounding bias. This paper contends that this confounding-based analysis cannot fully capture SP: there are cases of SP that cannot be explained away in terms of confounding. Previous works have argued that some cases of SP do not require causal analysis at all. Despite being a logically valid counterexample, we argue that this type of cases poses only a limited challenge to Pearl’s analysis of SP. In our view, a more powerful challenge to Pearl comes from cases of SP that do require causal analysis but can arise without confounding. We demonstrate with examples that accidental associations due to genetic drift, the use of inappropriate aggregate variables as causes, and interactions between units (i.e., inter-unit causation) can all give rise to SP of this type. The discussion is also extended to the amalgamation paradox (of which SP is a special form) which can occur due to the use of non-collapsible association measures, in the absence of confounding.

摘要：决定论通常被理解为关于世界因果秩序的哲学命题。然而，无论是主张所有领域的事件都由 先前事件所决定的全局决定论，还是主张仅特定领域的事件由先前事件所决定的局部决定论，均面临严 峻的理论挑战。决定论的支持者除了可以在坚持其命题式理解的同时尝试回应这些挑战外，一种更简洁 且有力的回应方式是直接否认决定论本质上是试图描述世界因果秩序的哲学命题。范·弗拉森提出，包 括经验主义在内的一些哲学观点本质上是行动者所秉持的哲学立场，而非意图描述客观事实的哲学命题。 以这一视角重新审视决定论，它可以被理解为一种行动者可以采取的哲学立场——即在缺乏充分反对理 由时，默认事件存在决定性因果解释，并在需要时积极寻找这种解释的态度。

摘要：The causal exclusion problem is often considered as one of the major difficulties for which non-reductive physicalists have no easy solution to offer. Some non-reductive physicalists address this problem by arguing that mental properties are to some extent causally autonomous. If this is the case, then mental properties will not be causally excluded by their physical realizers because causation, in general, is a relation between properties of the same level. In this paper, I argue that the response from causal autonomy cannot be successful for two reasons. First, it does not offer a satisfactory explanation for how mental particulars can have causal efficacy in a non-reductive physicalist framework. Second, the causal considerations underpinning this response do not really support the conclusion that mental properties are causally autonomous.