Weixin Cai | 蔡 伟鑫

Abstract: Experimental philosophy provides empirical evidence for philosophical discussions by collecting the folk’s intuitive judgments about philosophical thought experiments. However, many studies in mainstream experimental philosophy have limitations in their sample quality. The use of virtual subjects generated by large language models in social sciences suggests the possibility of extending this approach to experimental philosophy. When virtual subjects are used to simulate the intuitive judgments that human subjects would make about philosophical thought experiments, they function in effect as an indirect measure of folk philosophical intuitions. Accordingly, only if virtual subjects achieve sufficient measurement quality can their advantages in sample size and sample composition genuinely help alleviate the methodological limitations of mainstream experimental philosophy. To this end, this paper proposes an evaluation framework encompassing reliability, validity, and robustness, and uses it to empirically assess the measurement quality of virtual subjects generated by current mainstream large language models.

Abstract: Simplicity is widely recognized as a theoretical virtue in science. According to cognitivism, simplicity can justify theory choice in scientific practice because it is a cognitive value. The mainstream cognitivist account maintains that the cognitive value of simplicity consists primarily in its role as evidence for the truth of a theory. This paper argues that the mainstream cognitivist account faces intractable theoretical difficulties. It then offers an alternative cognitivist account that better captures the cognitive significance of simplicity. According to this new cognitivist account, the crucial form of simplicity in scientific practice is in fact “cognitive simplicity,” which serves as one of the ultimate cognitive values pursued by human scientists in virtue of their nature as non-ideal cognitive agents. This account not only allows cognitivists to avoid the difficulties faced by the mainstream cognitivist account, but also offers a more robust ground for the cognitive value of simplicity in science, which makes it a more attractive theoretical option.

Abstract: Determinism is typically understood as a philosophical proposition about the causal order of the world. However, both global determinism, the view that events in all domains are determined by antecedent events, and local determinism, the view that only events in certain domains are determined by antecedent events, face serious theoretical challenges. Rather than trying to address these challenges while preserving determinism as a proposition, one simpler yet more effective response for advocates of determinism is to deny that determinism is essentially a philosophical proposition about the causal order of the world. Van Fraassen argues that some philosophical positions, including empiricism, should be understood not as propositions aiming to describe objective facts, but as philosophical stances that agents can adopt. Re-examined from this perspective, determinism can be understood as a philosophical stance that agents can adopt. Specifically, it is an attitude in which one defaults to assuming the existence of a deterministic causal explanation for an event unless there are compelling reasons to reject this assumption, and actively seeks such an explanation when necessary.